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Decision Making for Autonomous Vehicles at Unsignalized
Intersection in Presence of Malicious Vehicles
Sasinee Pruekprasert1, Xiaoyi Zhang1, Jérémy Dubut1,2, Chao Huang1, Masako Kishida1
Abstract—In this paper, we investigate the decision making of
autonomous vehicles in an unsignalized intersection in presence
of malicious vehicles, which are vehicles that do not respect the
law by not using the proper rules of the right of way. Each
vehicle computes its control input as a Nash equilibrium of a
game determined by the priority order based on its own belief:
each of non-malicious vehicle bases its order on the law, while a
malicious one considers itself as having priority. To illustrate the
effectiveness of our method, we provide numerical simulations,
with different scenarios given by different cases of malicious
vehicles.
I. Introduction
Autonomous vehicles have a promising future of making
transportation time effortless and enabling the driver to
partake in other activities and therefore change everyday life
across the world. The greatest strength of autonomous vehicle
is to avoid traffic accidents caused by human error, and thus
to improve safety on roadways [1]. With the development of
autonomous vehicles, the focus in research moves towards
complex traffic scenarios such as intersections.
Intersections, at which multiple roads and opposing di-
rections of traffic meet together, are designed to prevent
traffic jams by easing the flow of traffic. The intersections
can be divided into signalized intersections and unsignalized
intersections [2]. The signalized intersections have signs and
signals to regulate traffic while the unsignalized intersections
do not. The unsignalized intersections are typically found
where the traffic flow is low. However, they usually have
higher collision frequencies than the signalized intersections
due to driver’s indecision. One report of National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in 2011 indicates that
40% of car collisions in the U.S. happen at intersections and
60% of them are related to unsignalized intersections [3].
It is expected that the autonomous vehicle can efficiently
avoid intersection mishap by making appropriate decisions
and orchestrating proper actions without driver’s intention.
The decision making by autonomous vehicle at unsignal-
ized intersections is a critical problem. Several approaches
have been recently proposed. One common way is to in-
vestigate the human behaviour in unsignalized intersection
in order to create a naturalistic decision process [4], [5].
For example, [6] proposes a human-like decision-making
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algorithm based on the human drivers’ data. A cooperative
approach is developed for collision avoidance at intersections
based on formal control theoretic techniques [7]. However,
the approach requires vehicle-to-vehicle communication and
thus is not scalable to general intersection handling. The
principle of reachability-based decision-making approach,
which predicts the probability of future collisions using error
propagation, is applicable to frontal collision avoidance at
intersections [8]. However, this approach may lead to con-
servative results. An intention-aware decision-making model
for unsignalized intersections is studied in [9], where drivers’
intentions are modelled using two-layered hidden Markov
models. However, the intention estimation is deterministic.
This paper uses game theory for the decision making.
Game theory is the study of decision making where the
players (e.g. vehicles) make choices by maximising their
own expected utility based on the possible actions of other
players. Thus, game theory provides a promising framework
for scenarios where interactions are involved and has been
widely used in various areas such as robotics [10] and
economy [11]. There are also many examples of using game
theory in intelligent transport systems. A game theoretic
approach for modelling the flow of vehicles in a road with
lane change is proposed in [12]. A cooperative strategy
in non-zero-sum games is applicable to solving conflict
situations between two autonomous vehicles in a roundabout
[13]. The decision making based on k-level games are studied
for two autonomous vehicles at unsignalised intersections
[14] and roundabouts [15]. In our previous work [16],
we proposed a decision making for multiple autonomous
vehicles at roundabouts based on Nash equilibria.
This paper proposes two main contributions. First, we
propose a game-theoretic decision making of multiple au-
tonomous vehicles in an unsignalized intersection using Nash
equilibria in a perfect information game. Instead of using
the concept of “aggressiveness” value proposed in [16], we
determine the decision order of the vehicles based on their
priorities (e.g., based on the rules of the right of way).
Second, we consider aggressive and unpredictable driving
behaviours of malicious vehicles to simulate the real complex
traffic environment. Before the widespread adoption of the
autonomous vehicles, the human drivers need to share roads
with autonomous vehicles. For this reason, we classify the
drivers using different levels of maliciousness, describing
vehicles breaking the law, or having irrational behaviours.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. First,
we formulate the problem in Section II. The game-theoretic
decision making approach is presented in Section III. Then,
Fig. 1. Road occupancy by over-approximation
Section IV introduces the design of formalising priorities.
After validating the performance of the proposed method in
Section V, Section VI draws the conclusions.
II. Problem formulation
A. Vehicles at unsignalised intersection
We consider autonomous vehicles in a four-way unsignal-
ized intersection. We assume that vehicles are driving on the
left and that there are at most four vehicles at the intersection,
entering from different directions. Their decision making
depends on the vehicles that are going to enter or are already
engaged in the intersection, but not on those that have already
left the intersection. We also assume that every vehicle knows
which way every other vehicle is intending to use, as every
vehicle declares its intention using their turn signal.
B. Vehicle configurations
We focus on the high-level decision making of autonomous
vehicles following a precomputed path. For this reason, we
do not consider the path trackers and the low-level control
layer in this work. So then, we over-approximate the road
occupancy of each vehicle using three circles (much as [17],
see Fig. 1) and assume that the vehicles perfectly follow the
given navigation paths.
Much as [16], we consider the case where the navigation
path of each vehicle i is fixed and denoted by path(i) ∈
{“straight”,“turn right”,“turn left”}. Thus, each vehicle can
only control its acceleration along the given navigation path
at each time step. More specifically, at each time step t, each
vehicle i chooses its acceleration ai(t) in a finite set in order
to minimise their overall cost functions.
The configuration of the vehicle i at time step t is denoted
by:
Xi(t) = [xi(t), yi(t), vi(t), ai(t), stai(t)]> (1)
where (xi(t), yi(t)) is the position of the vehicle i (where (0, 0)
is the center of the intersection), vi(t) is its velocity, ai(t) is its
acceleration, and stai(t) ∈ {“entering” , “inside” , “leaving”}
is its current status (i.e., not yet entered, already inside the
intersection, or far enough from the centre of the intersection)
respectively.
Then, given the control input, that is, the acceleration ai(t),
the configuration at time step t + 1 is represented by:
Xi(t + 1) = Fi(Xi(t), ai(t)), (2)
where the function Fi is computed from the navigation path
and returns the configuration of the vehicle i after one time
type angelic inter. demonic irrational
initial. right of way selfish noneS.IV-A S.II-C i.e. highest priority
decision
Nash equilibrium randommaking
S.III
update right of way
fitting nonepriority +
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Fig. 2. Summary of the different level of maliciousness
step, assuming the vehicle has constant acceleration ai(t)
between the time steps t and t + 1.
C. Rules for the right of way
For this paper, we use Japanese rules for deciding priorities
of vehicles [18]. Rules are slightly different in other coun-
tries, especially on the side that have more priority (e.g., left
in Japan [18], right in Australia [19]). Each vehicle intending
to enter an unsignalized intersection then has to give the right
of way to any vehicle (in order of importance):
A) already engaged in the intersection,
B) on its left-hand side,
C) significantly closer to the intersection.
A vehicle can proceed and engage in the intersection, as
long as it does not cross the way of a vehicle to which
it should have given the right of way. In Section IV, we
describe more precisely how we implement these rules in
our decision making.
D. Levels of maliciousness
In this paper, we consider four kinds of vehicles (see
Fig. 2):
• Angelic. Such a vehicle tries to follow the rules of
Section II-C and to avoid any collision.
• Intermediate. Such a vehicle does not follow the rules
from Section II-C by initially considering that it has
priority. However, it may give priority to other vehicles
if the situation requires it.
• Demonic. Such a vehicle is selfish: it does not respect
the rules and believes that it always has the priority.
However, it considers other vehicles’ behaviours in its
decision making.
• Irrational. Such a vehicle randomly chooses its acceler-
ation at every time step, independently of the situation.
Our goal is to see how our ego vehicle – considered as
angelic – behaves in presence of different types of vehicles,
including some that do not respect the rules, at different
degrees of severity.
E. Structure of the decision making
In the following two sections, we describe more precisely
our decision making for autonomous vehicles with different
levels of maliciousness. Our method consists of two main
components: maintaining priority orders (Section IV), and
computing the control inputs (Section III). Both components
depend on the computations of Nash equilibria (Section III-
A), similarly to our previous paper [16].
III. Control inputs and predictions, as Nash equilibria
Other than irrational vehicles, each vehicle determines its
acceleration based on rational decision making. In this sec-
tion, we discuss a game-theoretic approach to the problem,
similarly to [16]. Using the concept of priority order that
we will describe more precisely in Section IV, we formulate
the decision making problem as a finite perfect-information
game. The players are non-cooperative vehicles, and they try
to minimise their cost.
A. n-player game with perfect information
We consider 1-round sequential games with perfect and
complete information G = (P, Γ, (H1, . . . ,Hn)) where:
• P = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of players,
• Γ is a finite set of strategy profiles,
• Hj : Γn → R is the cost function for player j.
In such a game, every player chooses a strategy profile
from Γ to minimise its cost function. We are particularly
interested in Nash equilibria, that is, a set of strategies γ1,
. . . , γn for every player that is optimal in the sense that for
every player j, for every strategy γ′j :
Hj(γ1, . . . , γn) ≤ Hj(γ1, . . . , γ′j, . . . , γn)
When a total order ≺ on the set of players is given, it is
possible to compute such a Nash equilibrium by backward
induction: intuitively, the order ≺ gives an order with which
the players choose their strategy in such a way they ensure
optimality.
We invite an interested reader to take a look at usual
textbooks, much as [20], for more details on game theory.
B. Cost functions for the decision making in an intersection
1) Cost at each time step: We first introduce the cost of
a vehicle at each time step, which we call the step-cost. The
step-cost of the vehicle i is given by
Si(X, ≺) = φsafei (X, ≺) + φveloi (X) (3)
where X is a vector of configurations as in (1), i.e.,
X = [X>1 , . . . , X>n ]>
and ≺ is a total order on the set of vehicles.
2) Safety: For each pair of vehicles i and k, let d(k, i) be
the distance between their occupancy, given by the union of
three circles (see Section II-B and Fig. 1).
With this, we define the safety feature by
φ
safe
i (X, ≺) =
∑
k,i
φki (X, ≺),
where
φki (X, ≺) =

0 if stai = “leaving”,
0
else if the navigation paths
of i and k do not collide,
0 else if d(k, i) ≥ D,
Cd · (D − d(k, i))2 else if d(k, i) ≤ Ddanger,
0
else if i is minimal for ≺
i.e. i have highest priority,
Cn · (D − d(k, i))2 otherwise
(4)
Here, 0 < Cn  Cd, 0 < Ddanger < D are given constants.
The intention is that, as long as there is no danger of
collision, the vehicle i does not care about safety, but when
there is a possibility of collision, the closer the vehicle k is,
the more careful the vehicle i is. A special case is when the
vehicle i has the highest priority, where i cares less about
safety. This case is in order to break symmetric situations
where all vehicles would be too conservative.
3) Velocity: Let vl be the speed limit of the road. We
define the velocity feature by
φveloi (X) =
{
Cu · (vl − vi)2 if vl ≥ v
Co · (vl − vi)2 otherwise
(5)
Here, we choose 0 < Cu  Co so that each vehicle obeys
the law.
4) Accumulated cost function: We construct the accumu-
lated cost function based on the receding horizon control
approach [21], which determines the control inputs of the
vehicles based on the predicted future up to a horizon time
step h < ∞.
Given a vector of accelerations a = [aj(s)]j∈N,0≤s≤h−1,
define Kj(X, ≺, a) =
h−1∑
s=0
λs · Sj(X̂(a, s), ≺) where λ is the
discounted factor and X̂(a, s) is defined by induction on s:
• X̂(a, 0) = X ,
• X̂(a, s + 1) = [Fk(X̂k(a, s), ak(s)]k∈N .
C. Decision game
In a very similar spirit as [16], we describe a collection
of games whose players are the vehicles at the intersection.
Assume that a total order ≺ on the set of vehicles and a
vector of configurations X are given. We define the game
GX,≺ as follows:
• The set P of players is the set of vehicles.
• The set Γ is a finite set of acceleration patterns, that is,
a finite subset of Rh , where h is the time horizon.
• For every vehicle j, Hj(a) = Kj(X, ≺, a).
• The order is given by ≺.
We can then compute a Nash equilibrium using backward
induction as described in Section III-A. This produces a
collection of acceleration patterns that we denote by
a(X, ≺) = [aj(s, X, ≺)]j∈N,0≤s≤h−1.
The intention of aj(s, X, ≺) is to be a prediction of the
acceleration of the vehicle j after s time steps, starting from
the configuration X , considering ≺ as the priority order.
D. Computing control inputs and predicted configurations
Consider a vehicle i that is not irrational. At each time
step t, the vehicle i observes the precise configuration X(t)
of every car. It also maintains a priority order ≺i,t , a total
order on the set of vehicles. We will see in Section IV how
this order is initialised and updated.
From those data, the vehicle i can consider the game
GX(t),≺i, t , and then compute a Nash equilibrium as previ-
ously. We then obtain:
• the control input ai(t) of the vehicle i at time step t
given by ai(0, X(t), ≺i,t ),
• a prediction âi, j(t) by the vehicle i of the acceleration
of the vehicle j at time step t.
From these predicted accelerations, the vehicle i can
compute a prediction of the configuration of the vehicle j
at time step t + 1 by:
X̂i, j(t + 1) = Fj(Xj(t), âi, j(t))
E. Resolving deadlocks
The previous subsection described a way of computing the
control input by solving a game. This method can however
lead to deadlocks, that is, situations where no vehicle takes
the decision to go on, and every vehicle waits for others to
take the lead. This would typically happen when there is a
vehicle in each of the four ways, and that there is no clear
priority order that would resolve the situation. Formally, for
a vehicle i that is not irrational, this case is to be considered
when:
1) the velocities of all vehicles are zero, and
2) the accelerations of all vehicles are precisely predicted
using ≺i,t .
In the theory of concurrent system, it is known that it is
impossible to avoid such a situation using only deterministic
choices, and a solution is to introduce some randomness to
resolve the situation [22].
A vehicle i can unlock the situation in two cases:
• either when detecting a deadlock and considering having
the highest priority, that is, i being minimal for ≺i,t ,
• or when i already detected a deadlock at time t − 1.
In those cases, the vehicle i set its acceleration ai(t + 1)
without following a Nash equilibrium. Concretely, in our
simulations, this vehicle i can set its acceleration ai(t + 1)
to 10m/s2 with probability 0.25, which will ultimately break
the symmetry of a deadlock situation.
IV. Formalising Priorities
Again, other than irrational vehicles, each vehicle assumes
some total order. In this section, we describe how each of
those vehicles i initialises and updates a total order ≺i,t on
the set of vehicles. This process depends on the type of
the vehicle. This is the main difference from [16], where
the order ≺ was deduced from the behaviours of other cars,
described by their “aggressiveness” values. In this paper, the
order is obtained from the rules of the right of way, and by
the character angelic/demonic of the cars.
A. Initialising priorities
1) Angelic case: Let us assume first that the vehicle i is
angelic. In this case, the vehicle i will try to comply to the
rules of the right of way as in Section II-C. For that reason,
the vehicle i initialises its priority order ≺i,0 by randomly
choosing a total order that satisfies the following:
A) If staj = “inside” and if stak , “inside”, then j ≺i,0 k.
B) Else, if the number of vehicles is less than 4 and j is
“on the left-hand side” of k, j ≺i,0 k.
C) Else, let dj and dk be the distances of j and k from
the centre of the intersection, respectively. If j is sig-
nificantly closer to the centre of the intersection than k,
meaning that dk − dj > 2 meters, then j ≺i,0 k.
2) Selfish cases: Now, let us assume that the vehicle i is
demonic or intermediate. Such a vehicle will consider itself
as initially having priority, and will not care about other
vehicles. So the vehicle i will initialise its priority order ≺i,0
by randomly choosing any total order on the set of vehicles
such that i is the lowest element i ≺i,0 j for all j , i.
B. Updating the priority predictions
As explained in Section II-D, demonic vehicles do not
update their priority order, while intermediate and angelic
ones do. Thus, if the vehicle i is demonic, we always have
≺i,t+1=≺i,t for any time step t. If the vehicle i is angelic or
intermediate, it will update its priority only when necessary:
when the priority from the rules of the right of way changes
and when its predictions are imprecise.
1) Update according to the rules of the right of way: If
the vehicle i is angelic, i always updates its priority order
whenever the right of way changes. For example, when a
vehicle leaves the intersection and when a vehicle that does
not have priority enters the intersection. For this case, we
update ≺i,t+1 according to the current right of way in the
same way as in Section IV-A. If the rule of the right of way
does not change at the current time step t, we use ≺i,t+1=≺i,t .
2) Update due to imprecise predictions: We consider this
type of update for intermediate vehicles and angelic vehicles
that do not use the update according to the rules of the right
of way at the current time step t+1. Suppose that i is one of
those vehicles. As in Section III-D, given the priority order
≺i,t and the observed configuration X(t) at the previous time
step t, the vehicle i can predict the configurations X̂i, j(t + 1)
of any other vehicle j. In the case where these predictions
are different from the observed configurations Xj(t + 1), the
vehicle i updates its priority order to fit more closely these
new observations. To this end, the vehicle i computes the
Nash equilibrium of the decision game GX(t),≺ for any total
order ≺, and choose ≺′ as the total order such that:
• The difference between predicted and observed acceler-
ations is minimal:
≺′∈ argmin≺′
∑
j∈N
|aj(0, X j(t), ≺′) − aj(t + 1)|.
Fig. 3. The unsignalized intersection used for the simulations, the three
navigation paths, and the initial positions of each vehicle.
• If several ≺′ satisfy the first condition, choose the one
that gives the minimal acceleration ai(0, X(t), ≺′).
The intention of the second condition is the following: the
reason why vehicle i needs to change its priority order is
because some vehicles are going against its believes (either
the rules of the right of way for angelic, or selfishness for
intermediate). In any case, the vehicle has to be particularly
careful in the case it is dealing with a demonic or an irrational
vehicle. We also define ≺i,t+1 as follows:
• If ai(0, X(t), ≺′) ≤ ai(0, X(t), ≺i,t ), ≺i,t+1 =≺′.
• Otherwise, ≺i,t+1 =≺′ with probability 0.25, and
≺i,t+1 = ≺i,t with probability 0.75.
Again the intention of the second case is to be careful in
a situation where the vehicle would benefit by being more
aggressive, while in a situation that contradicts its believes.
V. Experimental results
To verify the effectiveness of our approach, we perform
numerical simulations using Matlab 2018a and 2018b.
A. Experiment scenario
We consider four vehicles approaching an unsignalized in-
tersection as shown in Fig. 3: each vehicle approaching from
each entrance. We assume that all vehicles have rectangle
shapes, and over-approximate the road occupancy of each
vehicle using three circles shown in Fig. 1. We consider that
two vehicles collide if their road occupancy areas intersect.
The structure of the intersection and the three navigation
paths are also illustrated in Fig. 3. The navigation path type
of each vehicle is randomised. The length and width of each
vehicle are randomised within the range (3.5m, 5.5m) and
(1.5m, 2.1m), respectively. We consider that the navigation
paths of given two vehicles do not collide only when the
two vehicles approach the intersection from the opposite
directions, and each vehicle either turns left or goes straight.
For each vehicle i, stai(t) is given as follows:
1) stai(t) = “entering” if the vehicle i is approaching
the intersection but none of its part has yet entered
the intersection, i.e., the rectangle that represents the
vehicle has not yet intersected the red area in Fig. 3.
2) stai(t) = “leaving” if more than half of the vehicle is
already outside the intersection.
3) stai(t) = “inside” otherwise.
TABLE I
Simulation Results
Case Collision rate(%) Congestion rate(%) Avg. Total time steps
1 0 0 56.87 (5.687s)
2 0 0.2 53.98 (5.398s)
3 0 0 59.09 (5.909s)
4 0.4 4.0 91.88 (9.988s)
1’ 0 0.5 55.43 (5.543s)
2’ 0 1.4 50.58 (5.058s)
3’ 0 9.4 55.81 (5.581s)
4’ 1.1 14.3 75.82 (7.582s)
The decision making is performed every 0.1s. The dis-
counted factor for the accumulated cost function is λ = 0.8.
The speed limit of the road is vl = 16.7m/s. The constant
parameters are as follows: Cn = 20, Cd = 10300, D = 25m,
Ddanger = 0.5m, Cu = 1, and Co = 1000.
We use the following patterns of acceleration/deceleration
sequences with a time horizon h = 3. All the accelerations
in this section are in m/s2.
• [−50,−50,−50] for a deceleration,
• [0, 0, 0] for no acceleration,
• [10, 0, 0] for a small acceleration,
• [20, 0, 0] for a strong acceleration.
The accelerations of a irrational vehicle are randomly
selected from the set {−50, 0, 10, 20}.
B. Results and analysis
We perform 2000 simulations for all those cases.
1 Four angelic vehicles.
2 Three angelic vehicles and one demonic vehicle.
3 Four intermediate vehicles.
4 Three intermediate vehicles and one irrational vehicle.
1000 simulations are done with initial velocity vi(0) = 0
(cases 1-4), and 1000 simulations with random initial veloc-
ity depending on the type of the vehicle (cases 1’-4’):
• if the vehicle is demonic or irrational, we randomly
choose in the interval [0, 16.7]m/s,
• if the vehicle is angelic or intermediate, we randomly
choose in the interval [0, 6]m/s.
Observe that cases 3 and 4 contain no angelic vehicles,
even though we assume that the ego vehicle should be
angelic. This is to see how robust the fitting method of
Section IV-B is for intermediate vehicles.
As presented in Table V-B, we evaluate the simulations by
considering the following criteria. The first column presents
the collision percentage. The second column presents the
percentage of the simulations that have congestions, which
are situations such that: 1) there are at least two vehicles,
i and j, such that stai(t) = staj(t) = “inside” and 2) the
navigation paths of both vehicles may collide. The third
column presents the average total time that the vehicles spend
running along their navigation paths.
For cases 1, 2, and 3, all vehicles successfully leave
the intersection without any collisions. Some collisions are
(a) time step = 9 (b) time step = 16 (c) time step = 20
Fig. 4. A dangerous situation
detected for the case 4, due to the unpredictable behaviour of
the irrational vehicle. In the cases where the initial velocity
is possibly non zero, we detect more congestions, due to the
fact that vehicles have less time to make their decision before
entering the intersection. However, the total time is shorter
because each vehicle starts with some initial velocity.
The results also show that the vehicles may spend less
time in the intersection if some of them are selfish. The case
2 is particularly interesting because it has fewer time steps
than case 1. One possible explanation for this case is that
the selfish vehicle makes the decision making easier: it will
force itself through the intersection, so that angelic vehicles
have no choice but to let it go first. After this vehicle leaves
the intersection, the decision making with three vehicles is
much easier.
In Fig. 4, we present a dangerous situation of the case 4’.
The red vehicle is irrational, while the other three vehicles
are intermediate. In Fig. 4(a), the red vehicle is entering the
intersection, while the other three are stopped. However, in
Fig. 4(b), the red vehicle suddenly stops, so the pink vehicle
thinks it can enter the intersection. Finally in Fig. 4(c), the red
vehicle starts again and the pink vehicle is forced to update
its priority order as in Section IV-B and gives the way to
the red vehicle. This scenario demonstrates that our decision
making is robust enough to avoid such potential accidents.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a decision making for au-
tonomous vehicles in a unsignalized intersection in presence
of selfish and irrational vehicles. The decision is made by
computing Nash equilibria of sequential games played by
the vehicles. The decision orders of those games are based
on the believes of which vehicles have priority: angelic
vehicles define their priorities based on the rules of the right
of way, while malicious ones regard themselves as having
priority or do not pay any attention to priorities. We consider
several scenarios where vehicles respecting the law (angelic)
share the road with selfish vehicles and irrational ones,
which randomly choose their accelerations. We illustrate
those scenarios in our numerical simulations, demonstrating
its feasibility and the robustness of our decision making in
presence of malicious vehicles. As a future work, systematic
experiments based on more sophisticated and practical traffic
simulators will be conducted to further evaluate our model,
and more detailed techniques will be adopted to eliminate
the potential hazards.
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